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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 745 
Accident time: 07:40 Accident Date: 11/07/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU 203, See map 
coordinates 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 11/07/2007 
ID original source: None Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: M77 submunition Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
soft 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 707270/3679376 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
A brief QA report of this incident was made available in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file 
has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. 
This record will be revised if more information becomes available. 
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
LAF SAMPLING TEAM INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR [Demining group] BAC 




1. BACKGROUND OF TASK 
Task Start date: 17 October 2006 
Task end date: 21 December 2006 
Task: CBU- 203,  
Task Dossier 7 - 002 
UTM of Task: 707270 3679376 
Organisation Involved: [Demining group]  
Reported by: [Name removed] &LAF Sampling Team  
Reported to: Mr. [Name removed] (Operations Officer MACC SL), Mr. [Name removed] (Chief 
of QA MACC SL), Ltn. [Name removed], Mr. [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM 
ERW Type found: US M-77 Submunition  
 
2. DETAILS OF ITEMS FOUND on SubSurface [Demining group] BAC Task 
Evidence 
Sampling Team located submunition M77 on CBU 203 in cleared and completed area by 
[Demining group]. 
Item found in depth 5cm. 
 
Interview with [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM 
[Name removed] [Demining group] TFM arrived on site after the item reported to be found in 
[Demining group] previously cleared task, on his arrival myself as Supervisor ([Name 
removed]), LAF Sampling Team, TL, LAF Planning Officer, MACC SL Operations Officer and 
MACC SL Chief of QA section went on location of item M 77 found and [Name removed] 
[Demining group] TFM agreed that item found was inside the cleared task by [Demining 
group] subsurface 
Photos of Item M77 located in CBU 203 
 
[M77 as found] 
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[Other photographs showed significant other amounts of metal found during the check. The 
demining group was clearing with metal-detectors so should have left cleared ground metal-
free.] 
 
Reported by: [Name removed] QA Officer, LAF Sampling Team Site Supervisor. 
[No record of the corrective action required of the demining group was made available.] 
 
Analysis 
The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as Field control inadequacy 
because the demining group was clearing using Minelab metal detectors and apparently left 
significant metal behind, including at least one M77 submunition. The only explanation for so 
much metal being left is that the search was not conducted appropriately and parts of the 
Task area were not searched. This is the “Inadequate training” referenced under Notes. 
Given the time lapse between the end of the clearance and the QA check (seven months), it 
is possible that some of the metal was placed after the event. It is also possible that some 
came from the destruction of devices at the end of the Task (although this should have been 
collected to prevent its causing trouble during the QA check). 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full report with 
some explanation of how the device was missed and what was done to correct the situation. 
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